one whose task it was to crush every rival power in Algeria. For this
end, eighty-five thousand men were placed under his command. Thomas
Bugeaud was a man of great ability, and he has the credit of devising
the only method by which such an antagonist as Abd-el-Kader, in such a
country, could be subdued.

Against an adversary so mobile, so full of expedients and resource,
mobility and incessantly offensive movements offered the only chance of
success. The French Commander knew that it was no mere army, but a
people in arms, that he was to encounter. His forces were at once
organized in many small, compact columns, each composed of a few
infantry battalions and two squadrons of horse, with a little transport
train of mules and camels and two mountain howitzers. Picked men alone,
acclimatized and used to toil, were employed, and they carried nothing
but their muskets and ammunition, with a little food. These columns were
placed under the command of such energetic leaders as Changarnier and
Cavaignac, Canrobert and Pélissier, Bedeau and Lamoricière, St. Arnaud
and the Duc d'Aumale.

The campaign opened with the revictualling of Medea and Miliana, with
great losses to the French, as Abd-el-Kader disputed every inch of the
ground. Bugeaud, personally operating in Oran, reached Tekedemt on May
25th, and found it deserted and in flames. Boghar, Saida, and other
fortresses were successively destroyed. The enemies of the Sultan were
paying a heavy price for success. At the end of 1841 Bugeaud, out of
sixty thousand men in the field, had only four thousand fit for duty.
The rest had perished or were invalided for the time, from the toil of
marches, incessant fighting, and the heat of the climate. The French
Government's proposals of peace, on certain terms, only confirmed
Abd-el-Kader in his resolve to try the extremities of war.