was this attitude of Germany that prevented any advance being made beyond
the Convention of 1899. Good reasons, of course, could be given for this
attitude; but they are the kind of reasons that goodwill could have
surmounted. It seems clear that there was goodwill in other Governments,
but not in that of Germany, and the latter lies legitimately under the
prejudice resulting from the position she then took. German critics have
recognized this as freely as critics of other countries. I myself feel no
desire to minimize the blame that attaches to Germany. But Englishmen who
criticize her policy must always ask themselves whether they would support
a British Government that should stand for a general treaty of compulsory
arbitration.

On the question of limitation of armaments the German Government has
been equally intransigeant. At the Conference of 1899, indeed, no serious
effort was made by any Power to achieve the avowed purpose of the meeting.
And, clearly, if anything was intended to be done, the wrong direction
was taken from the beginning. When the second Conference was to meet it
is understood that the German Government refused participation if the
question of armaments was to be discussed, and the subject did not appear
on the official programme. Nevertheless the British, French, and American
delegates took occasion to express a strong sense of the burden of
armaments, and the urgent need of lessening it.

The records of the Hague Conferences do, then, clearly show that the German
Government was more obstinately sceptical of any advance in the direction
of international arbitration or disarmament than that of any other Great
Power, and especially of Great Britain or the United States. Whether, in
fact, much could or would have been done, even in the absence of German
opposition, may be doubted. There would certainly have been, in every
country, very strong opposition to any effective measures, and it is only