The Crisis of the Naval War by John Rushworth Jellicoe
page 22 of 303 (07%)
page 22 of 303 (07%)
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The Staff organization at this period is shown graphically below. C.N.S. | +-- D.C.N.S. | . | | . +-- Operations Division. | . | | | . | +-- Home | . | +-- Foreign | . +-- Mobilization Division. | . +-- Signal Section. | . +-- Intelligence Division. | . +-- A.C.N.S. | +-- Trade Division. +-- Convoys Section. +-- Anti-Submarine Division. +-- Mine-Sweeping Division. Stress was laid in a Staff memorandum issued by me on the fact that the various divisions were on no account to work in watertight compartments, but were to be in the closest touch with one another. The dotted line connecting the D.C.N.S. and the A.C.N.S. in the graph was defined as indicating that there should be the fullest co-operation between the different portions of the Staff. In the summer of 1917 the growth of the convoy system necessitated |
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