The Crisis of the Naval War by John Rushworth Jellicoe
page 43 of 303 (14%)
page 43 of 303 (14%)
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The particular points in which this specially intimate knowledge is required are: (a) The science of navigation and of handling ships of all types and classes. (b) Gunnery. (c) Torpedoes and mines. It is the case at present (and the conditions are not likely to alter) that each one of these subjects is a matter for specialist training. Every executive officer has a general knowledge of each subject, but it is not possible for any one officer to possess the knowledge of all three which is gained by the specialist, and if attempts are made to plan operations without the assistance of the specialists grave errors may be made, and, indeed, such errors were made during the late war, perhaps from this cause. In my view, therefore, it is desirable that specialist officers should be included in a Naval Staff organization and not be merely "attached" to it. It may be said that a Staff can take the advice of specialist officers who are _attached_ to it for that purpose. But there is a danger that the specialist advice may never reach the heads of the Staff. Human nature being what it is, the safest procedure is to place the specialist officer where his voice must be heard, i.e. to give him a position on the Staff, for one must legislate for the _average_ individual and for normal conditions of work. |
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