incompatible with the idea of any manifestation of design in the
universe, that it denies final causes. A serious objection this, and
one that demands very serious attention.

The proposition, that things and events in Nature were not designed to
be so, if logically carried out, is doubtless tantamount to atheism.
Yet most people believe that some were designed and others were not,
although they fall into a hopeless maze whenever they undertake to
define their position. So we should not like to stigmatize as
atheistically disposed a person who regards certain things and events
as being what they are through designed laws, (whatever that
expression means,) but as not themselves specially ordained, or who,
in another connection, believes in general, but not in particular
Providence. We could sadly puzzle him with questions; but in return he
might equally puzzle us. Then, to deny that anything was specially
designed to be what it is is one proposition; while to deny that the
Designer supernaturally or immediately made it so is another: though
the reviewers appear not to recognize the distinction.

Also, "scornfully to repudiate" or to "sneer at the idea of any
manifestation of design in the material universe"[2] is one thing;
while to consider, and perhaps to exaggerate, the difficulties which
attend the practical application of the doctrine of final causes to
certain instances is quite another thing: yet the Boston reviewers, we
regret to say, have not been duly regardful of the difference.
Whatever be thought of Darwin's doctrine, we are surprised that he
should be charged with scorning or sneering at the opinions of others,
upon such a subject. Perhaps Darwin's view is incompatible with final
causes;--we will consider that question presently;--but as to the
"Examiner's" charge, that he "sneers at the idea of any manifestation