forced upon the Ussurie forces, it could be carried out only with great
loss, both of men and material. The next position would be behind
Spascoe, with Lake Hanka as a protection on the left flank and the
forest on the right. If this could not be held, then the railway
junction at Nikolsk would be endangered, with the possibility of the
communications being cut with other forces operating along the
Transbaikal Railway and at Irkutsk. Under these circumstances the
council decided that there was nothing left but to ask for authority
from the War Office to send my battalion forward at once to the Ussurie
front to render what assistance was possible. I naturally pointed out
that my battalion was composed of B1 men, most of whom had already done
their "bit" on other fronts, and that a few weeks before I had had about
250 General Service men in my ranks, but on a blundering suggestion of
the G.O.C. at Singapore they had been taken from my unit and transferred
to others doing garrison duty in India. I had protested against this at
the time, but had been over-ruled by London, so that my command was
reduced to men of the lowest category. However, after making this
statement I informed the council that in view of the desperate
circumstances in which the Ussurie force was placed I would render every
assistance in my power.

About 2 P.M. Commodore Payne, R.N., came to my quarters and showed me a
paraphrased cable he had received from the War Office. The cable
authorised the immediate dispatch of half my battalion to the front,
subject to the approval of the commanding officer. It seems to me they
might have plucked up courage enough to decide the matter for
themselves, instead of putting the responsibility upon the local
commander. As it was left to me, however, I gave the necessary orders at
once. That very night, August 5, I marched through Vladivostok to
entrain my detachment. It consisted of 500 fully equipped infantry and a