Our road for about two miles lay alongside the railway, after which the
soddened nature of the ground and the danger of losing direction in the
darkness forced me to take to the railway. About a mile and a half along
the track brought us to our armoured trains, where we were to pick up
our Machine-Gun Section, which was to act with us if necessary, or
remain as a reserve or rallying-point in case of need. Except for the
sentries, the train crews were asleep, and almost within rifle range of
our place of assembly. I halted my men and roused Captain Bath to
inquire if he had received instructions as to his part in the coming
battle. He informed me that he had received a telephone message from
General Oie (through Major Pichon) which he could not understand and had
asked for it to be repeated. He thereupon produced the message, which
was to the effect that a battle would commence at 3 A.M., but that the
British armoured trains and the British troops were not to be allowed
to take any part in the impending engagement. On the production of the
actual message I began to understand why the order of battle had been
given to me too late for me to be at the rendezvous with Colonel
Inagaki, and the refusal of the units of my command to march with me.
These instructions to Captain Bath from the Japanese Headquarters
explained the riddle. I gave Captain Bath instructions to move forward
in my support in case of need and to watch the proceedings generally, to
render aid to any Allied detachment which might be in difficulties, and
otherwise to obey General Oie's orders. This duty he performed with
complete satisfaction to the commanders of the French and Czech
detachments.

Having arranged my rear, the men of the 25th were ordered to move
forward in file on each side of the railway track to the point selected
for our rendezvous. The time was now 3.25 A.M., the dull light of
dawning day enabling us to distinguish moving objects four hundred yards