maritime provinces were their special preserve. They looked with the
greatest suspicion upon the forces and efforts of the other Allies,
especially British and American, and by their orders tried deliberately
to exclude them from their counsels and as far as possible from the
administration of the territory recovered from the Terrorists. The 27th
Battalion of American Infantry had landed at Vladivostok a few days
before the battle of Dukoveskoie, and promises were made that they
should be hurried forward to take a share in the fighting; but the
Japanese, who controlled the railway, saw to it that they arrived a day
late. Instead of pushing them ahead, they were detrained at Svagena, and
then entrained again from day to day, always about fifty versts behind
the Japanese front. In addition the Japanese never trusted their Allies.
No order to the Japanese Army was ever given to the Allied commanders
until the operation had been carried out or had got to such a stage as
to make it impossible for them to take part or offer suggestions.

Captain Stephan (now Major), of the Czech Army, and myself knew every
road and track from Shmakovka to Svagena, and were certain that with
proper care the whole enemy force on the Ussurie front could have been
destroyed or captured. The Japanese would neither consult nor inform any
of their Allies about any movement until it had taken place. They
treated the Czech commanders with the most scant courtesy; the English
officers' carriages were invaded by their private soldiers, who would
insolently ask what business we had in Siberia and when did we propose
to go home; but they reserved their most supreme contempt for the
Russian people. These poor wretches they drove off the railway
platforms, using the butts of their rifles upon the women as well as the
men, just as though they were dealing with a tribe of conquered
Hottentots. I did not understand this behaviour on the part of our
Eastern Ally, and felt it could only be the irresponsible bullying of a