the bridge prove to be objectively false, and we, walking over the
bank into the water, be set free from that which is subjectively on
the farther bank of Styx."

Then I, laughing: "This hardly coincides, Alcibiades, with
Protagoras's opinion, that subjective truth was alone useful."

"But rather proves," said Socrates, "that undiluted draughts of it
are of a hurtful and poisonous nature, and require to be tempered
with somewhat of objective truth, before it is safe to use them-at
least in the case of bridges."

"Did I not tell you," interrupted Alcibiades, "how the old deceiver
would try to put me to bed of some dead puppy or log? Or do you not
see how, in order, after his custom, to raise a laugh about the
whole question by vulgar examples, he is blinking what he knows as
well as I?"

S. "What then, fair youth?"

A. "That Protagoras was not speaking about bridges, or any other
merely physical things, on which no difference of opinion need
occur, because every one can satisfy himself by simply using his
senses; but concerning moral and intellectual matters, which are not
cognisable by the senses, and therefore permit, without blame, a
greater diversity of opinion. Error on such points, he told us-on
the subject of religion, for example-was both pardonable and
harmless; for no blame could be imputed to the man who acted
faithfully up to his own belief, whatsoever that might be."