as he might of the brave man, but always and in all things both
outward and inward? Does it not seem strange to you, for it does to
me, that to make mistakes concerning such beings should not bring an
altogether infinite and daily punishment, not by any resentment of
theirs, but, as in the case of music or numbers, by the very fact of
our having mistaken the laws of their being, on which the whole
universe depends?'-What do you suppose Protagoras would be able to
answer, if he faced the question boldly?"

A. "I cannot tell."

S. "Nor I either. Yet one thing more it may be worth our while to
examine. If one should mistake concerning God, will his error be
one of excess, or defect?"

A. "How can I tell?"

S. "Let us see. Is not Zeus more perfect than all other beings?"

A. "Certainly, if it be true that, as they say, the perfection of
each kind of being is derived from him; he must therefore be himself
more perfect than any one of those perfections."

S. "Well argued. Therefore, if he conceived of himself, his
conception of himself would be more perfect than that of any man
concerning him?"

A. "Assuredly; if he have that faculty, he must needs have it in
perfection."