A. "He would."

S. "And therefore to be less just, according to the argument, than
he really is?"

A. "True."

S. "And therefore his error concerning Zeus, would be in this case
an error of defect?"

A. "It would."

S. "And so on of each of his other properties?"

A. "The same argument would likewise, as far as I can see, apply to
them."

S. "So that, on the whole, man, by the unassisted power of his own
faculty, will always conceive Zeus to be less just, wise, good, and
beautiful than he is?"

A. "It seems probable."

S. "But does not that seem to you hurtful?"

A. "Why so?"

S. "As if, for instance, a man believing that Zeus loves him less
than he really does, should become superstitious and self-