position as a mistress towards her slave?"

P. "Certainly. It seems, then, better to assume the other
alternative."

S. "It does. But does it not follow, that when you were enamoured
of this spirit, you did not possess it?"

P. "I fear so, by the argument."

S. "And I fear, too, that we agreed that he only who possessed the
spirit of truth saw facts as they are; for that was involved in our
definition of the spirit of truth."

P. "But, Socrates, I knew, at least, that one and one made two, and
that a horse had four legs. I must then have seen some facts as
they are."

S. "Doubtless, fair boy; but not all."

P. "I do not pretend to that."

S. "But if you had possessed the spirit of truth, you would have
seen all facts whatsoever as they are. For he who possesses a thing
can surely employ it freely for all purposes which are not contrary
to the nature of that thing; can he not?"

P. "Of course he can. But if I did not possess the spirit of
truth, how could I see any truth whatsoever?"