referred to a committee to ascertain the truth of its statements; nor
shall any vote be taken, in regard to it, by which the People may learn
the sentiments of their representatives.

If Congress may thus dispose of petitions on one subject, they may make
the same disposition of petitions on any and every other subject. Our
representatives are bound by oath, not to pass any law abridging the
right of petition, but if this resolution is constitutional, they may
order every petition to be delivered to their door-keeper, and by him to
be committed to the flames; for why preserve petitions on which _no
action can be had_? Had the resolution been directed to petitions for an
object palpably unconstitutional, it would still have been without
excuse. The construction of the Constitution is a matter of opinion, and
every citizen has a right to express that opinion in a petition, or
otherwise.

But this usurpation is aggravated by the almost universal admission that
Congress does possess the constitutional power to legislate on the
subject of slavery in the District of Columbia and the Territories. No
wonder that a distinguished statesman refused to sanction the right of
the House to pass such a resolution by even voting against it[A]. The
men who perpetrated this outrage had sworn to support the Constitution,
and will they hereafter plead at the bar of their Maker, that they had
kept their oath, because they had abridged the right of petition _by a
resolution_, and not by law!

[Footnote A: Mr. J.Q. Adams, on his name being called, refused to vote,
saying, "the resolution is in direct violation of the Constitution of
the United States, and the privileges of the members of this House."]