creatures—thought, word, and body, are separate active causes of sin. The
Jaina doctrine agrees also in this case, which always specially represents
the three and prescribes for each a special control. [Footnote: Jacobi,
_Ind. Antiq._ Vol. IX, p. 159.]

Besides these rules, which perfectly agree with one another, there are
still two doctrines of the Nigaṇṭha to be referred to which seem to,
or really do, contradict the Jainas; namely, it is stated that Nâtaputta
demanded from his disciples the taking of four, not as in Vardhamâna's
case, of five great vows. Although this difficulty may seem very important
at first glance, it is, however, set aside by an oft repeated assertion in
the Jaina works. They repeatedly say that Pàrśva, the twenty-third Jina
only recognised four vows, and Vardhamâna added the fifth. The Buddhists
have therefore handed down a dogma which Jainism recognises. The question
is merely whether they or the Jainas are the more to be trusted. If the
latter, and it is accepted that Vardhamâna was merely the reformer of an
old religion, then the Buddhists must be taxed with an easily possible
confusion between the earlier and later teachers. If, on the other hand,
the Jaina accounts of their twenty-third prophet are regarded as mythical,
and Vardhamâna is looked upon as the true founder of the sect,—then the
doctrine of the four vows must be ascribed to the latter, and we must
accept as a fact that he had changed his views on this point. In any case,
however, the Buddhist statement speaks for, rather than against, the
identity of Nigaṇṭha with Jina. [Footnote: Jacobi, _loc. cit._.
p. 160, and Leumann, _Actes du Vlième Congrès Int. des Or_. Sect.
Ary. p. 505. As the Jaina accounts of the teaching of Pârśva and the
existence of communities of his disciples, sound trustworthy, we may
perhaps accept, with Jacobi, that they rest on a historical foundation.]

Vardhamâna's system, on the other hand, is quite irreconcilable with