movements which had hitherto set at nought the walls and parapets of
the Mexicans were here impracticable. Still, careful reconnaissance
had shown that, with all its difficulties, this was the most
favourable approach for the invading army. The gates of Belen and San
Antonio were beset by obstacles even more impracticable. The ground
over which the troops would advance to storm the fortress was far
firmer than elsewhere, there was ample space for the American
batteries, and if the hill were taken, the Mexicans, retreating along
two narrow causeways, with deep marshes on either hand, might easily
be deprived of all opportunity of rallying.

September 13.

On the night of the 11th four batteries of heavy guns were
established within easy range. On the 12th they opened fire; and the
next morning the American army, covered by the fire of the artillery,
advanced to the assault. In the victory of Molino del Rey, Magruder's
battery had taken little part. Jackson, posted with his section on
the extreme flank of the line, had dispersed a column of cavalry
which threatened a charge; but, with this brief interlude of action,
he had been merely a spectator. At Chapultepec he was more fortunate.
Pillow's division, to which the battery was attached, attacked the
Mexicans in front, while Worth's division assailed them from the
north. The 14th Infantry, connecting the two attacks, moved along a
road which skirts the base of the hill, and Magruder was ordered to
detach a section of his battery in support. Jackson was selected for
the duty, and as he approached the enemy's position dangers
multiplied at every step. The ground alongside was so marshy that the
guns were unable to leave the road. A Mexican fieldpiece, covered by
a breastwork, raked the causeway from end to end, while from the