"In the second place, if America does declare war upon Germany, it
would have little effect. The war will be over before she can
organise after the manner of Great Britain. Herr Helfferich
(former Minister of Finance and now Vive-Chancellor) feels that we
should do everything possible to keep America out, inasmuch as
thereby we shall be in a better position to conclude commercial
treaties after the war. Herr Helfferich exerted powerful influence
in the meeting at Great Headquarters at the time of the Sussex
Crisis. But our duty to ourselves is to win the war. If we starve
out England we win, no matter how many enemies we have. If we
fail, another enemy, even the United States, would not make our
defeat more thorough. We are justified, for our existence is at
stake. The only way we can escape defeat is by a successful U-boat
war against England. That would change defeat into overwhelming
victory. I am absolutely confident; that is why the slow methods
of the Chancellor make me so angry. It will take at least half a
year to bring England to her knees, and with our increased
privations he may wait too long. But we shall compel him; we shall
compel him."

Herr Stresemann later requested me not to publish these
statements--at least, not until a decision had been reached. I
did, however, lay the matter before the American Embassy in London
as soon as I arrived in England, since my investigations in Germany
left no doubt in my mind that she would play two great cards--one,
to work for peace through negotiation; the other, the last
desperate recourse to the submarine.

As I write (January 21st, 1917) I am convinced that it is only a
question of time until Germany is reduced to this last desperate