the farm and the shop; it diminishes the balance of trade against us
precisely to the extent of freights and passage money paid to American
vessels, and gives us a supremacy upon the seas of inestimable value in
case of foreign war.

Our Navy at the commencement of the late war consisted of less than 100
vessels, of about 150,000 tons and a force of about 8,000 men. We drew
from the merchant marine, which had cost the Government nothing, but
which had been a source of national wealth, 600 vessels, exceeding
1,000,000 tons, and about 70,000 men, to aid in the suppression of the
rebellion.

This statement demonstrates the value of the merchant marine as a means
of national defense in time of need.

The Committee on the Causes of the Reduction of American Tonnage, after
tracing the causes of its decline, submit two bills, which, if adopted,
they believe will restore to the nation its maritime power. Their report
shows with great minuteness the actual and comparative American tonnage
at the time of its greatest prosperity; the actual and comparative
decline since, together with the causes; and exhibits all other
statistics of material interest in reference to the subject. As the
report is before Congress, I will not recapitulate any of its
statistics, but refer only to the methods recommended by the committee
to give back to us our lost commerce.

As a general rule, when it can be adopted, I believe a direct money
subsidy is less liable to abuse than an indirect aid given to the same
enterprise. In this case, however, my opinion is that subsidies, while
they may be given to specified lines of steamers or other vessels,