It was the intention of General Johnston to fall back slowly before
McClellan, drawing him away from his base, then when the Federal Corps
become separated in their marches, to concentrate his forces, turn and
crush him at one blow. The low, swampy, and wooded condition of the
country from Yorktown up the Peninsula would not admit of the handling
of the troops, nor was there any place for artillery practice to be
effective. Now that he had his forces all on the South side of
the Chickahominy, and the lands more rolling and firm, he began to
contemplate a change in his tactics. Ewell, with several detached
regiments under Whiting, had been sent in the Valley to re-enforce
that fiery meteor, Stonewall Jackson, who was flying through the
Shenandoah Valley and the gorges of the Blue Ridge like a cyclone, and
General Johnston wished Jackson to so crush his enemy that his
troops could be concentrated with his own before Richmond. But the
authorities at Richmond thought otherwise. It is true Jackson had been
worsted at Kernstown by Shields, but his masterly movements against
Banks, Fremont, Siegle, and others, gave him such prestige as to
make his name almost indispensable to our army. McDowell, with forty
thousand men, lay at Fredericksburg, with nothing in his front but
a few squadrons of cavalry and some infantry regiments. Johnston was
thus apprehensive that he might undertake to come down upon his flanks
and re-enforce "Little Mc." or the "Young Napoleon," as the commander
of the Federal Army was now called. On the 20th of May, Johnston heard
of two of the Federal Corps, Keyes' and Heintzleman's, being on the
south side of the Chickahominy, while the others were scattered
along the north banks at the different crossings. McClellan had his
headquarters six miles away, towards the Pamunkey River. This was
considered a good opportunity to strike, and had there been no
miscarriages of plan, nor refusals to obey orders, and, instead,
harmony and mutual understanding prevailed, the South might have