constitution, as fixed by the Act of 1782, was fraught with dangers.
And it is no answer to say that not many difficulties had arisen
in the few years between 1782 and 1799; for, even though that is
partially true, the question for a statesman to consider was whether
they were likely to arise in the future; and the rebellion, which
was still seething, had made this all the more probable. First, on a
declaration of war by England, Ireland might refuse to take part in
it; and her refusal would paralyse the Empire. As early as 1791, Wolfe
Tone had pointed out that Ireland need not embark on the side of
Great Britain in the contest which was then pending; and one of his
followers had advocated an alliance with France. (This is of all the
more importance at the present day, when the Nationalists state that
their principles are the same as those of Wolfe Tone.) Secondly,
during a war, Ireland might refuse supplies to England. This course
was actually hinted at by Grattan. Thirdly, she might provoke a
commercial war of rates with England. This course was proposed in the
Irish House of Commons in 1784. Fourthly, she might put pressure on
the Sovereign to declare war against a country with which England was
at peace. This also was proposed in the Irish House, in the case of
Portugal. Fifthly, she might differ from England in any international
question in reference to the connection between them, as she did in
the Regency question. Sixthly, she might refuse--as she did--to make
a commercial treaty with Great Britain; and thus keep open the most
fertile sources of mutual jealousies and discontent. Grattan's best
friends had urged upon him in vain that refusing to assent to a
commercial treaty made the permanent government by two independent
legislatures impossible, and would bring about separation; he refused
to be guided by their advice, and at that time he still had supreme
power in the House. It is remarkable that even at a later date, whilst
vehemently opposing the Union, he took a delight in pointing out