which claim put forth by the Manhattan, the writer ventures the opinion:
First, that four hits out of six shots was poor shooting for a monitor
at a target like the Tennessee, and suggestive of considerable distance
between the vessels; second, that eye-witnesses have affirmed that only
one of the Manhattan's shot took effect, a solid shot that struck the
ram on the port beam, crushing her armor and splintering the backing,
but not entering the casemate, though leaving a clean hole through;
third, that the effect of that one shot showed what the Manhattan might
have accomplished had she taken as favorable a position as that chosen
by the Chickasaw; fourth, that it is believed the report of a board of
survey confirmed the opinion as to that one shot; fifth, that, as
between the great difference of sound in the firing of the fifteen-inch
gun and an eleven-inch, and the greater destructive effect of the larger
projectiles which could not but be felt by those receiving it, the enemy
would best be likely to know from what source they sustained the most
vital damage; sixth, that the concurrent opinions of the day, as given
by press correspondents, eye-witnesses to the conflict, magazine
summaries, official reports, the praise of Perkins on every lip, the
talk of his promotion by distinguished officers, and the testimony of
the enemy themselves, including Admiral Buchanan and Captain Johnston,
all go to show that the surrender of the Tennessee was due more to the
dogged and unrelenting effort and skilful management of Perkins of the
Chickasaw than from any other cause.

Asked the Tennessee's pilot of "Metacomet" Jouett: "Who commanded the
monitor that got under our stern?" adding, "D----n him! he stuck to us
like a leech; we could not get away from him. It was he who cut away the
steering gear, jammed the stern port shutters, and wounded Admiral
Buchanan."