out of compassion, shall come to his rescue, and kill any of those
that shall so restrain him, that is manslaughter."

Keyl.: "A and others without any warrant impress B to serve the king
at sea. B quietly submitted, and went off with the pressmaster.
Hugett and the others pursued them, and required a sight of their
warrant; but they showing a piece of paper that was not a sufficient
warrant, thereupon Hugett with the others drew their swords, and the
pressmasters theirs, and so there was a combat, and those who
endeavored to rescue the pressed man killed one of the pretended
pressmasters. This was but manslaughter; for when the liberty of
one subject is invaded, it affects all the rest. It is a
provocation to all people, as being of ill example and pernicious
consequences."

Lord Raymond, 1301. The Queen _versus_ Tooley _et_ _al_. Lord
Chief-Justice Holt says: "The prisoner (i.e. Tooley) in this had
sufficient provocation; for if one be impressed upon an unlawful
authority, it is a sufficient provocation to all people out of
compassion; and where the liberty of the subject is invaded, it is a
provocation to all the subjects of England, etc.; and surely a man
ought to be concerned for Magna Charta and the laws: and if any one,
against the law, imprisons a man, he is an offender against Magna
Charta."

I am not insensible to Sir Michael Foster's observations on these
cases, but apprehend they do not invalidate the authority of them as
far as I now apply them to the purposes of my argument. If a
stranger, a mere fellow-subject, may interpose to defend the
liberty, he may, too, defend the life of another individual. But,