party of soldiers, endeavoring to defend themselves against him,
happened to kill another person, who was innocent--though the
soldiers had no reason, that we know of, to think any person there,
at least of that number who were crowding about them, innocent; they
might, naturally enough, presume all to be guilty of the riot and
assault, and to come with the same design--I say, if on firing on
those who were guilty, they accidentally killed an innocent person,
it was not their fault. They were obliged to defend themselves
against those who were pressing upon them. They are not answerable
for it with their lives; for on supposition it was justifiable or
excusable to kill Attucks, or any other person, it will be equally
justifiable or excusable if in firing at him they killed another,
who was innocent; or if the provocation was such as to mitigate the
guilt of manslaughter, it will equally mitigate the guilt, if they
killed an innocent man undesignedly, in aiming at him who gave the
provocation, according to Judge Foster; and as this point is of such
consequence, I must produce some more authorities for it:

(1 Hawkins. 84): "Also, if a third person accidentally happen to be
killed by one engaged in a combat, upon a sudden quarrel, it seems
that he who killed him is guilty of manslaughter only," etc. (H. H
P. C. 442, to the same point; and 1 H. H. P. C. 484. and 4 Black,
27.)

I shall now consider one question more, and that is concerning
provocation. We have hitherto been considering self-defense, and
how far persons may go in defending themselves against aggressors,
even by taking away their lives, and now proceed to consider such
provocations as the law allows to mitigate or extenuate the guilt of
killing, where it is not justifiable or excusable. An assault and