clear that it is due to a number concerned? De Salaberry is, of
course, in every way the leading figure. His courage and spirit were
perfect, his intelligence rapid, his labor incessant, and the whole
choice of the field and strategy of the battle were, by all the
testimony, due to him. On the whole, it almost seems, in its broad
lights, like a battle of this one man against the enemy. His task was
the greater from the extent and obscurity of the battlefield. On these
accounts, some of those holding the positions used afterwards to say
there was no battle at all, and one--Lieut. Delisle, who received a
pension--that the whole thing was a farce. Frankly--and it may seem at
first sight like a discourtesy to say it--it is doubtful whether the
Voltigeurs would have stood much real fighting had they been opposed
to veterans. On reasonable consideration this objection must
disappear. It is well known that recruits away from their homes are
utterly unstable in their first battles. For instance, at Bull's Run,
in the first two battles of the American Civil War, it was a toss-up
which side would run away from the other, and they decided it by one
side doing so the first day, and the other side the second. Many of
the Upper Canadians were fearful and undecided at the beginning of the
War of 1812. It is pretty probable that the promptitude of the few
regulars in the country, including such officers as Brock, was its
salvation at the outset. Most of De Salaberry's own men had withdrawn
a month previous at the attack on the camp at Four Corners, though so
disproportionate an enterprise was no fair test of recruits. The
Sedentary Militia, when drafted, deserted in great numbers, and the
duty assigned to the newly raised Voltigeurs by their commander at
Chrysler's Farm just afterwards was that merely of making a temporary
display in the woods. De Salaberry probably intended to do more with
his division at Châteauguay, and might have succeeded if put to the
test, for they were now probably superior to the American force in the