priori_ assumption, however noble in its character and beneficent in its
tendency. How do we know that the reason of the Stoic is at harmony with
the world's law? I, perhaps, may see life from a very different point of
view; to me reason may dictate, not self-subdual, but self-indulgence; I
may find in the free exercise of all my passions an existence far more
consonant with what seems to me the dictate of Nature. I am proud;
Nature has made me so; let my pride assert itself to justification. I am
strong; let me put forth my strength, it is the destiny of the feeble to
fall before me. On the other hand, I am weak and I suffer; what avails a
mere assertion that fate is just, to bring about my calm and glad
acceptance of this down-trodden doom? Nay, for there is that within my
soul which bids me revolt, and cry against the iniquity of some power I
know not. Granting that I am compelled to acknowledge a scheme of things
which constrains me to this or that, whether I will or no, how can I be
sure that wisdom or moral duty lies in acquiescence? Thus the unceasing
questioner; to whom, indeed, there is no reply. For our philosophy sees
no longer a supreme sanction, and no longer hears a harmony of the
universe.

"He that is unjust is also impious. For the Nature of the Universe,
having made all reasonable creatures one for another, to the end that
they should do one another good; more or less, according to the several
persons and occasions; but in no wise hurt one another; it is manifest
that he that doth transgress against this her will, is guilty of impiety
towards the most ancient and venerable of all the Deities." How gladly
would I believe this! That injustice is impiety, and indeed the supreme
impiety, I will hold with my last breath; but it were the merest
affectation of a noble sentiment if I supported my faith by such a
reasoning. I see no single piece of strong testimony that justice is the
law of the universe; I see suggestions incalculable tending to prove that