constitution for Schleswig, which would practically have made it a part
of the Danish monarchy. The King gave his assent to it, an act which his
successor, Christian IX., ratified.

Now, this action violated the last treaty--that signed by the Powers at
London in 1852, which settled the affairs of the Duchies; and Bismarck
therefore had strong ground for appealing to the Powers concerned, as
also to the German Confederation, against this breach of treaty
obligations. The Powers, especially England and France, sought to set
things straight, but the efforts of our Foreign Minister, Lord John
Russell, had no effect. The German Confederation also refused to take
any steps about Schleswig as being outside its jurisdiction. Bismarck
next persuaded Austria to help Prussia in defeating Danish designs on
that duchy. The Danes, on the other hand, counted on the unofficial
expressions of sympathy which came from the people of Great Britain and
France at sight of a small State menaced by two powerful monarchies. In
fact, the whole situation was complicated by this explosion of feeling,
which seemed to the Danes to portend the armed intervention of the
Western States, especially England, on their behalf. As far as is known,
no official assurance to that effect ever went forth from London. In
fact, it is certain that Queen Victoria absolutely forbade any such
step; but the mischief done by sentimental orators, heedless
newspaper-editors, and factious busybodies, could not be undone. As Lord
John Russell afterwards stated in a short "Essay on the Policy of
England": "It pleased some English advisers of great influence to
meddle in this affair; they were successful in thwarting the British
Government, and in the end, with the professed view, and perhaps the
real intention, of helping Denmark, their friendship tended to deprive
her of Holstein and Schleswig altogether." This final judgment of a
veteran statesman is worth quoting as showing his sense of the mischief