rest in; and none, even by our adversaries, can be admired, which is not
inconsistent with the principles that regulate human affairs and human
conduct at present, or which makes men then to have been a different
kind of beings from what they are now.

But the short consideration which, independently of every other,
convinces me that there is no solid foundation in Mr. Hume's conclusion,
is the following. When a theorem is proposed to a mathematician, the
first thing he does with it is to try it upon a simple case, and if it
produce a false result, he is sure that there must be some mistake in
the demonstration. Now to proceed in this way with what may be called
Mr. Hume's theorem. If twelve men, whose probity and good sense I had
long known, should seriously and circumstantially relate to me an
account of a miracle wrought before their eyes, and in which it was
impossible that they should be deceived: if the governor of the country,
hearing a rumour of this account, should call these men into his
presence, and offer them a short proposal, either to confess the
imposture, or submit to be tied up to a gibbet; if they should refuse
with one voice to acknowledge that there existed any falsehood or
imposture in the case: if this threat were communicated to them
separately, yet with no different effect; if it was at last executed; if
I myself saw them, one after another, consenting to be racked, burnt, or
strangled, rather than live up the truth of their account;--still if Mr.
Hume's rule be my guide, I am not to believe them. Now I undertake to
say that there exists not a sceptic in the world who would not believe
them, or who would defend such incredulity.

Instances of spurious miracles supported by strong apparent testimony
undoubtedly demand examination; Mr. Hume has endeavoured to fortify his
argument by some examples of this kind. I hope in a proper place to show