United States for redress. Names of States which might possibly so
combine could be given, but it is better to refrain. It is not
inconceivable that German penetration and intrigue at some future time
might promote a combination of the kind. All sorts of influences might
be brought to bear on certain of the States and on their
representatives. Dynastic claims might even affect them.

Unless it be with some country which she can trust and whose Government
and its aims she can thoroughly rely upon, and then only for some
limited and specific purpose, Great Britain, or any other naval or
military power, ought not to bind itself to go to war and employ its
forces. We must be free to reduce those forces or to refrain from
employing them in making war. An engagement which might in
circumstances, the real character of which no one can foresee at
present, compel us to undertake a war at the bidding of others is a
thing to which we ought never to consent. Engagements to make war are
not a safe way of promoting peace. They may possibly be justified where
there is some clearly specified object, some defined case in which
nations ally themselves to prevent some particular wrong, such, for
example, as guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Even for a single
specific agreement of this kind a very strong case is required, but that
is a totally different thing from agreeing to provide a kind of world
police to enforce and execute the orders of a Council of heterogeneous
States under conditions the nature of which no one can predict now. We
cannot tell beforehand with any certainty what will be the real
character of the proposed League Council, nor what motives may inspire
its members at some future time, nor whom the majority of them will in
fact represent. It does not necessarily follow that there can be no
sanction of any kind to enforce the rules of International Law or the
decisions of a League of Nations to prevent a breach of international