hold a common belief give expression to it, has its effect. An agreement
between nations or individuals, even where there is no legal sanction,
would be regarded as something that they will try to carry out. The
breach of such an agreement would excite the "resentment which is the
life-blood of law." Still the risk of disregard of the obligations is
great unless there is a definite material sanction, an evil imposed by
force on a wrong-doer, and no doubt it will be urged that some
objections to employ military and naval power to enforce the obligations
imposed by the League may be raised against the less drastic proposal
for an economic boycott, but in actual working the two things, as
already pointed out, differ enormously. The suggested economic boycott
imposes a similar obligation on all members of the League; all alike can
immediately forbid all intercourse by their subjects with the aggressor,
instead of imposing on certain members the duty of going to war.
Secondly, it does not imply the maintenance of great armaments by any
State.

It is constantly found that a penalty of smaller amount, a less severe
punishment, is more likely to prevent a wrong than a heavier one,
provided that it is prompt and certain. Had Germany known a few months
sooner that Britain would assuredly go to war and put into such war her
whole resources if Belgium were invaded, it is not improbable that that
outrage would never have been committed; but had Germany also known that
the moment her troops crossed the Belgian frontier every German ship in
the United States would be interned, every American citizen punished as
a criminal by the United States Government if he traded with Germany,
that "intercourse" with the aggressor would be at once forbidden, and
that these restraints would be continued until complete restitution had
been made, is it not morally certain that Belgium would not have been
invaded? War might have been prevented. In fear of such an injury to