arrival here, and of the other events which have happened to me; and
as a ship was about to depart for Malaca I was unwilling to let slip
the opportunity to write these lines and to send them in it by way
of Yndia, that your Majesty might be informed of what other events
have taken place and have come under my notice.

In my previous letters I gave your Majesty a detailed account of
the state of affairs in Mindanao and Jolo, and sent a report of
the retreat to Pintados of Captain Juan Xuarez Gallinato with your
Majesty's force that was at Dapitan. The reason of this retreat was
the information received that the enemy were preparing a great fleet
to attack Pintados, which rendered it desirable to place the force
at a point whence it could better be transported to the region where
it might be needed. The result showed the importance of the retreat;
for the enemy, being informed of it, dared not go to the said islands
of Pintados, but advanced with a squadron of ships against Cuyo and
the neighboring islands, distant from Pintados, where they pillaged
everything and killed and took captive more than seven hundred
persons. [3] This is misery enough; and, as I wrote your Majesty,
this unfortunate condition of affairs _cannot be remedied except by
arming galleys [underlined in original]_ or large galliots, with which
it will be possible to hasten from island to island. In many regions
the mere knowledge of their existence will be sufficient to put a
bridle on the audacity of these barbarians; and with them it will be
possible to hunt out the enemy at home. With garrisons no beneficial
results can be expected, in view of the great number of the islands;
if we put soldiers wherever they are needed, the whole force of these
provinces would not suffice--no, nor many more. Even if we had the
troops, the cost would be enormous and the gain nothing; for the Moros
come by sea, seize their booty, and take flight, without waiting to