The New Physics and Its Evolution by Lucien Poincare
page 27 of 282 (09%)
page 27 of 282 (09%)
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Nothing, however, proves that those acquisitions which are the most ancient in historical order ought, in the development of science, to remain the basis of our knowledge. Nor does any theory prove that our perceptions are an exact indication of reality. Many reasons, on the contrary, might be invoked which tend to compel us to see in nature phenomena which cannot be reduced to movement. Mechanics as ordinarily understood is the study of reversible phenomena. If there be given to the parameter which represents time,[1] and which has assumed increasing values during the duration of the phenomena, decreasing values which make it go the opposite way, the whole system will again pass through exactly the same stages as before, and all the phenomena will unfold themselves in reversed order. In physics, the contrary rule appears very general, and reversibility generally does not exist. It is an ideal and limited case, which may be sometimes approached, but can never, strictly speaking, be met with in its entirety. No physical phenomenon ever recommences in an identical manner if its direction be altered. It is true that certain mathematicians warn us that a mechanics can be devised in which reversibility would no longer be the rule, but the bold attempts made in this direction are not wholly satisfactory. [Footnote 1: I.e., the time-curve.--ED.] On the other hand, it is established that if a mechanical explanation of a phenomenon can be given, we can find an infinity of others which likewise account for all the peculiarities revealed by experiment. But, as a matter of fact, no one has ever succeeded in giving an indisputable mechanical representation of the whole physical world. |
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