Sir John Orde, who was an aversion to him (as well he might be), had
seen the French fleet off Cadiz, and failed to procure him the
information as to their course. Nelson believed, and properly
believed, that an alert mind would have found a way of spying out the
enemy's intentions, but Sir John's resource did not extend to anything
beyond the fear of being attacked and overpowered. He obviously was
devoid of any of the arts of the wily pirate or smuggler. A month
after the French had passed through the Gut, Nelson got his chance. A
change of wind came within five hours after a southerly slant brought
his ships to anchor in Gibraltar bay for water and provisions. He
immediately gave the signal to heave the anchors up, and proceeded
with a fair wind which lasted only forty-eight hours. He anchored his
fleet to the east of Cape St. Vincent, and took on board supplies from
the transports. He received from different sources conflicting
accounts as to the objective of the French, but the predominating
opinion was that they had gone to the West Indies. Nelson was in a
state of bewilderment, but decided to follow his own head, and pinned
his faith on the instinct that told him to follow westward "to be
burnt in effigy if he failed, or Westminster Abbey if he succeeded."
The adventure was daring, both in point of destination and the unequal
strength of the relative fleets. Nelson had ten ships of the line and
three frigates, against Villeneuve's eighteen and two new
line-of-battle ships.

But the British Admiral's genius and the superiority of his
commanders, officers, and men, should they come to battle, would more
than match Villeneuve's superiority in ships. Nelson, always sure of
his own powers, could also depend upon the loyalty of men of every
rank under him. He knew that the terrible spirit which shattered and
scattered Spanish Philip's armada was an inheritance that had grown