Rochefort squadron, which sailed when Villeneuve did in January,
returned to Europe on the 26th May. Collingwood maintains that the
West Indian trip was to weaken the British force on the European side,
and states that the return of Rochefort's squadron confirmed him in
this. He is too generous to his mortified comrade to detract in any
degree from the view that, having escaped from the West Indies, they
would naturally make for Cadiz or the Mediterranean. Here is one of
the many wise sayings of Napoleon: "In business the worst thing of all
is an undecided mind"; and this may be applied to any phase of human
affairs. Nelson can never be accused of indecision. His chase to the
West Indies was a masterpiece of prescience which saved the British
possessions, and, but for the clumsy intelligence he received, the
French would have been a hammered wreck and the projected ruse to
combine it with the Rochefort squadron off Ireland blown sky-high.

The present generation of critics can only judge by the records handed
down to them, and after exhaustive study we are forced to the opinion
that Nelson was right in following Villeneuve to the West Indies, nor
was he wrong in calculating that they were impulsively making their
way back to the Mediterranean. Consistent with his habit of never
claiming the privilege of changing his mind, he followed his settled
opinion and defended his convictions with vehement confidence. He had
not overlooked Ireland, but his decision came down on the side of
Cadiz or Toulon, and there it had to rest, and in rather ridiculous
support of his contention he imputes faulty navigation as the cause of
taking them out of their course, and finding themselves united to the
Rochefort squadron off Cape Finisterre. The bad-reckoning idea cannot
be sustained. The French were no match for the British under Nelson's
piercing genius as a naval strategist, or in the flashes of dazzling
enthusiasm with which he led those under his command to fight, but it