for my purpose, even though the court should be of opinion that the
prisoner was guilty of reviling; because the words of the statute are
in the conjunctive, providing punishment only where profane speaking
and reviling are united, being levelled, not at one alone, but at
both as one act. It should also be borne in mind, that the statute is
penal, and for that reason must be construed, strictly, in favor of
liberty. But I will now proceed to inquire whether there has been any
reviling in the sense of the statute. Who was intended to be protected
against injurious language? Reasonable beings only, certainly.
Assuredly not the delicate feelings of horses, or cows, or pigs, and
if so, much less those of an inanimate object, like a book. Now,
it will be recollected that the language uttered characterized the
contents of a book, not Mr. Davenport. The words were consistent with
the supposition that the prisoner cherished the highest respect for
him, whatever his opinion might be of the sermon. It was then absurd
to pursue a man criminally for criticising a book, and requesting
another not to read it, which was all that had been done."

Here Ketchum inquired how his brother Tippit would get over the words,
"man of sin," which it was testified had been applied by the prisoner
to Davenport.

Mr. Tippit treated the inquiry with great contempt. "Does the
gentleman," he asked, in turn, "claim for Mr. Davenport a superhuman
degree of piety? Would he have us understand that Mr. Davenport is
not a sinful man, and is the expression made use of by Mr. Holden more
than tantamount to that? I do not think the words worthy of notice,"
he said, "nor am I disposed to waste time on them." Mr. Tippit
concluded by saying, that if a man, in the honest expression of his
opinions about a book, was to be dealt with criminally, free speech,