who talk of peace. But, for once, his meaning was not clear. If he meant
that to suggest peace to the enemy at this stage is both dangerous and
ridiculous, he will be approved by the nation. But if he meant that
terms of peace must not even be mentioned among ourselves, he will find
people ready to disagree with him, and to support the weight of his
sarcasm and his reproof. I am one of those people. Bellicose by
disposition, I nevertheless like to know what I am fighting for. This is
perhaps an idiosyncrasy, but many persons share it, and they are not to
be ignored. It may be argued that Mr. Asquith has defined what we are
fighting for. He has not. He has only defined part of what we are
fighting for. His reference to the overthrow of Prussian militarism is
futile, because it gives no indication of the method to be employed. The
method of liberating and compensating Belgium and other small
communities is clear; but how are you to overthrow an ideal? Prussian
militarism will not be destroyed by a defeat in the field. Militarism
cannot overthrow militarism; it can only breed militarism. The point is
of the highest importance.

I do not assume that Mr. Asquith's notions about the right way to
overthrow militarism are not sound notions. I assume that they are
sound. I think that his common sense is massive. Though it is evident
that he lets his Ministerial colleagues do practically what they choose
in their own spheres, and though there are militarists in the Cabinet, I
do not, like The Morning Post, consider that the Prime Minister exists
in a stupor of negligence. On the contrary, I assume that at the end of
the war, as at the beginning, Mr. Asquith will control the foolish, and
that common sense will prevail in the Cabinet when a treaty is the
subject of converse. Still further, I will assume that, contrary to
nearly all precedent, the collective sagacity of the Ministry has not
been impaired, and its self-conceit perilously tickled, by the long