immortals, he urged Congress to await calmly the action of the people
of the Territories.

Douglas was among those unimpressionable younger men who would not
believe the Union to be in danger. Perhaps by his Southern connections
he knew better than most Northern men, the real temper of the South.
Perhaps he did not give way to the prevailing hysteria, because he was
diverted from the great issues by the pressing, particular interests
of his constituents. At all events, he had this advantage over Clay,
Webster, and Calhoun, that when he did turn his attention to schemes
of compromise, his vision was fresh, keen, and direct. He escaped that
subtle distortion of mental perception from which others were likely
to suffer because of long-sustained attention. To such, Douglas must
have seemed unemotional, unsensitive, and lacking in spiritual
fineness.

Illinois with its North and its South was also facing a crisis. To the
social and political differences that bisected the State, was added a
keen commercial rivalry between the sections. While the State
legislature under northern control was appropriating funds for the
Illinois and Michigan canal, it exhibited far less liberality in
building railroads, which alone could be the arteries of traffic in
southern Illinois. At a time when railroads were extending their lines
westward from the Atlantic seaboard, and reaching out covetously for
the produce of the Mississippi Valley, Illinois held geographically a
commanding position. No roads could reach the great river, north of
the Ohio at least, without crossing her borders. The avenues of
approach were given into her keeping. To those who directed State
policy, it seemed possible to determine the commercial destinies of
the Commonwealth by controlling the farther course of the railroads