evidently with a high ambition. His position was naturally felt as a
direct menace by the neighbouring states of Babylon and Lydia, whose
royal families were interconnected. Crœsus of Lydia was the first to
take alarm and to devise measures for his own security. He formed the
conception of a grand league between the principal powers whom the rise
of Persia threatened, for mutual defence against the common enemy; and,
in furtherance of this design, sent, in B.C. 547, an embassy to Egypt,
and another to Babylon, proposing a close alliance between the three
countries. Amasis had to determine whether he would maintain his
subjection to Babylon and refuse the offer; or, by accepting it, declare
himself a wholly independent monarch. He learnt by the embassy, if he
did not know it before that Nabonadius, the Babylonian monarch, was in
difficulties, and could not resent his action. He might probably think
that, under the circumstances, Nabonadius would regard his joining the
league as a friendly, rather than an unfriendly, proceeding. At any
rate, the balance of advantage seemed to him on the side of complying
with the request of Crœsus. Crœsus was lord of Asia Minor, and it was
only by his permission that the Ionian and Carian mercenaries, on whom
the throne of the Pharaohs now mainly depended, could be recruited and
maintained at their proper strength. It would not do to offend so
important a personage; and accordingly Amasis came into the proposed
alliance, and pledged himself to send assistance to whichever of his two
confederates should be first attacked. Conversely, they no doubt pledged
themselves to him; but the remote position of Egypt rendered it
extremely improbable that they would be called upon to redeem their
pledges.

Nor was even Amasis called upon actually to redeem the pledges which he
had given. In B.C. 546, Crœsus, without summoning any contingents from
his allies, precipitated the war with Persia by crossing the river