following: it is self-destroyed, since it can find no sustenance and no
water. Thus the sole question, when a foreign host invades Egypt, is
this: Can it, or can it not, defeat the full force of Egypt in an open
battle? If it gains one battle, there is no reason why it should not
gain fifty; and this is so evident, and so well known, that on Egyptian
soil one defeat has almost always been accepted as decisive of the
military supremacy. A beaten army may, of course, protract its
resistance behind walls, and honour, fame, patriotism, may seem
sometimes to require such a line of conduct; but, unless there is a
reasonable expectation of relief arriving from without, protracted
resistance is useless, and, from a military point of view, indefensible.
Defeated commanders have not, however, always seen this, or, seeing it,
they have allowed prudence to be overpowered by other considerations.
Psamatik, like many another ruler of Egypt, though defeated in the
field, determined to defend his capital to the best of his power. He
threw himself, with the remnant of his beaten army, into Memphis, and
there stood at bay, awaiting the further attack of his adversary.

It was not long before the Persian army drew up under the walls, and
invested the city by land, while the fleet blockaded the river. A single
Greek vessel, having received orders to summon the defenders of the
place to surrender it, had the boldness to enter the town, whereupon it
was set upon by the Egyptians, captured, and destroyed. Contrarily to
the law of nations, which protects ambassadors and their escort, the
crew was torn limb from limb, and an outrage thus committed which
Cambyses was justified in punishing with extreme severity. Upon the fall
of the city, which followed soon after its investment, the offended
monarch avenged the crime which had been committed by publicly executing
two thousand of the principal citizens, including (it is said) a son of
the fallen king. The king himself was at first spared, and might perhaps