to their assertions of the obligation of unqualified obedience,--should
the army be faithful,--should the King, by artifice or by victory,
attract to his side the wavering mass of his subjects, and expel the
Dutch invader,--there would be an awful reckoning for all who had taken
part against the Court. The proceedings after the insurrection under
Monmouth had not entirely shown how cruel James could be. His position
then had been far less critical than now. Then he enjoyed some degree of
popular esteem, and the preparations against him were not on a
formidable scale. Now he was thoroughly frightened. In proportion to his
present alarm would be his fury, if he should come off victorious. The
last chance was pending. If now resisted in vain, he would be
henceforward irresistible. Englishmen who should now oppose their king
must be sure to conquer him, or they lost all security for property,
liberty, and life. Was it any way prudent for the feeble, colony of
Massachusetts, divided by parties, and with its administration in the
hands of a tool of the tyrant, to attempt to throw itself into the
contest at this doubtful stage?

It is unavoidable to suppose that these considerations were anxiously
weighed by the patriots of Massachusetts after the reception of the
intelligence from England. It is natural to believe, that, during the
fortnight which followed, there were earnest arguments between the more
and the less sanguine portions of the people. It seems probable that the
leaders, who had most to fear from rashness, if it should be followed by
defeat, pleaded for forbearance, or at least for delay. If any of them
took a different part, they took it warily, and so as not to be publicly
committed. But the people's blood was up. Though any day now might bring
tidings which would assure them whether a movement of theirs would be
safe or disastrous, their impatience could not be controlled. If the
leaders would not lead, some of the followers must take their places.