was a strategic necessity, fully warranted by existing conditions,
although temporary.]


It is not easy to reconcile the views which we take, in turn, through
the eye and object lenses of a field-glass, so that the real subject of
examination will not be distorted by too great nearness or remoteness.

If we bring back to this hour the events of one hundred years ago, it is
certain that the small armies and the smaller appliances of force then
in use will seem trifling, in contrast with those which have so recently
wearied science and have tasked invention in the work and waste of war.

If we thrust them back to their proper place behind the memory of all
living men, we only see a scattered people, poorly armed, but engaged in
hopeful conflict with Great Britain, then mistress of the seas, proudly
challenging the world to arms, and boldly vindicating her challenge.

In an effort to reproduce that period and so balance the opposing
factors that the siege of Boston and the deliverance of Washington at
Brooklyn and New York shall have fair co-relation and full bearing upon
the resulting struggle for National Independence, there must be some
exact standard for the test j and this will be found by grouping such
data as illustrate the governing laws of military art.

It has never been claimed that the siege of Boston was not the
legitimate result of British blunder and American pluck. In a previous
paper, the siege itself has been presented as that opportunity and
training-school exercise which projected its experience into the entire
war, and assured final triumph. It has not been as generally accepted,