waterway that might be constructed, the secretary argued that if any
struggle for the control of the canal were to arise England would have
an advantage at the outset which would prove decisive. "The treaty," he
remarked, "commands this government not to use a single regiment of
troops to protect its interests in connection with the interoceanic
canal, but to surrender the transit to the guardianship and control of
the British navy." The logic of this paper was unanswerable from an
American point of view.

The war between Chili and Peru had virtually ended with the capture of
Lima on January 17, 1881. The state department made strenuous exertions
to bring about the conclusion of an early peace between Chili and the
two prostrate states which had been crushed in war. The influence of the
government was brought to bear upon victorious Chili in the interest of
peace and magnanimity; but, owing to an unfortunate misapprehension of
Mr. Blaine's instructions, the United States ministers did not promote
the ends of peace. Special envoys were accordingly sent to South
America, accredited to the three governments, with general instructions
which should enable them to bring those belligerent powers into friendly
relations. After they had set out from New York Mr. Blaine resigned, and
Mr. Frelinghuysen reversed the diplomatic policy with such precipitate
haste that the envoys on arriving at their destination were informed by
the Chilian minister of foreign affairs that their instructions had been
countermanded, and that their mission was an idle farce. By this
reversal of diplomatic methods and purposes the influence of the United
States government on the South American coast was reduced to so low a
point as to become insignificant. Mr. Blaine's policy had been at once
strong and pacific. It was followed by a period of no policy, which
enabled Chili to make a conqueror's terms with the conquered and to
seize as much territory as pleased her rapacious generals.