of the nation, that every individual might consent to the law, and each
reciprocally bind the other to the observation of it. This polity, if so
it may be called, subsists still in all its simplicity in Poland.

But as in such a society as we have mentioned the people cannot be
classed according to any political regulations, great talents have a
more ample sphere in which to exert themselves than in a close and
better formed society. These talents must therefore have attracted a
great share of the public veneration, and drawn a numerous train after
the person distinguished by them, of those who sought his protection, or
feared his power, or admired his qualifications, or wished to form
themselves after his example, or, in fine, of whoever desired to partake
of his importance by being mentioned along with him. These the ancient
Gauls, who nearly resembled the Germans in their customs, called
Ambacti; the Romans called them Comites. Over these their chief had a
considerable power, and the more considerable because it depended upon
influence rather than institution: influence among so free a people
being the principal source of power. But this authority, great as it
was, never could by its very nature be stretched to despotism; because
any despotic act would have shocked the only principle by which that
authority was supported, the general good opinion. On the other hand, it
could not have been bounded by any positive laws, because laws can
hardly subsist amongst a people who have not the use of letters. It was
a species of arbitrary power, softened by the popularity from whence it
arose. It came from popular opinion, and by popular opinion it was
corrected.

If people so barbarous as the Germans have no laws, they have yet
customs that serve in their room; and these customs operate amongst them
better than laws, because they become a sort of Nature both to the