was the national capital. It was part of the intellectual creed of
practically every liberal Russian that there was a natural affinity between
the great autocracies of Germany and Russia, and that a revolution in
Russia which seriously endangered the existence of monarchical absolutism
would be suppressed by Prussian guns and bayonets reinforcing those of
loyal Russian troops. It was generally believed by Russian Socialists that
in 1905 the Kaiser had promised to send troops into Russia to crush the
Revolution if called upon for that aid. Many German Socialists, it may be
added, shared that belief. Autocracies have a natural tendency to combine
forces against revolutionary movements. It would have been no more strange
for Wilhelm II to aid Nicholas II in quelling a revolution that menaced his
throne than it was for Alexander I to aid in putting down revolution in
Germany; or than it was for Nicholas I to crush the Hungarian Revolution in
1849, in the interest of Francis Joseph; or than it was for Bismarck to
rush to the aid of Alexander II in putting down the Polish insurrection in
1863.

The democrats of Russia knew, moreover, that, in addition to the natural
affinity which served to bind the two autocracies, the Romanov and
Hohenzollern dynasties had been closely knit together in a strong union by
years and years of carefully planned and strongly wrought blood ties. As
Isaac Don Lenine reminds us in his admirable study of the Russian
Revolution, Nicholas II was more than seven-eighths German, less than
one-eighth of his blood heritage being Romanov. Catherine the Great, wife
of Peter III, was a Prussian by birth and heritage and thoroughly
Prussianized her court. After her--from 1796 to 1917--six Czars reigned in
Russia, five of whom married German wives. As was inevitable in such
circumstances, the Russian court had long been notoriously subject to
German influences and strongly pro-German in its sympathies--by no means a
small matter in an autocratic country. Fully aware of their advantage, the