they threw upon us in great numbers, with a continual fire from their
gun batteries.

After sixteen days' siege with a most violent cannonade, without a
moment's interruption, M. Nogaire, an officer in the Regiment of Royal
Roussillon, came to us from Montreal, having crossed directly through
the woods, with some Indians for his guides, with two letters from De
Bougainville, one of which was from him to Vaudreuil, and the other
from M. de Levis. It was a very critical conjuncture, having only two
days' provision for the garrison, which had subsisted until the
arrival of the English troops by means of fishing-nets, that river
abounding with the most delicious fish, with seven or eight oxen,
which had been kept as a reserve and killed by the enemy's cannon. M.
de Vaudreuil's letter contained a permission to M. de Bougainville to
capitulate or retire from the island if it was possible. M. de Levis'
letter was a positive order to defend that post to the last extremity.
De Bougainville, notwithstanding his genius, good sense and learning,
with personal courage, and who lacked only taste for the study of the
art of war to distinguish himself, was nevertheless put to a nonplus
how to act from the contradictory orders he received. In this dilemma
he shewed me the letters, asking at the same time my advice; and my
answer was:--"That in two days famine must oblige us to surrender to
the enemy at discretion. That the reinforcements of a thousand men at
Montreal might be of the greatest importance, and help to make a good
countenance when the English army had advanced in the neighborhood of
it. That it was M. de Vaudreuil who commanded-in-chief in Canada, and
not M. de Levis; and that there was yet a possibility of retiring with
the garrison towards the north side of the island, where the swampy
ground upon the border of the river had hindered the English from
establishing a post." De Bougainville immediately decided for a