is no contradiction in material things partaking of the ideas of one and
many; neither is there any contradiction in the ideas of one and many, like
and unlike, in themselves. But the contradiction arises when we attempt to
conceive ideas in their connexion, or to ascertain their relation to
phenomena. Still he affirms the existence of such ideas; and this is the
position which is now in turn submitted to the criticisms of Parmenides.

To appreciate truly the character of these criticisms, we must remember the
place held by Parmenides in the history of Greek philosophy. He is the
founder of idealism, and also of dialectic, or, in modern phraseology, of
metaphysics and logic (Theaet., Soph.). Like Plato, he is struggling after
something wider and deeper than satisfied the contemporary Pythagoreans.
And Plato with a true instinct recognizes him as his spiritual father, whom
he 'revered and honoured more than all other philosophers together.' He
may be supposed to have thought more than he said, or was able to express.
And, although he could not, as a matter of fact, have criticized the ideas
of Plato without an anachronism, the criticism is appropriately placed in
the mouth of the founder of the ideal philosophy.

There was probably a time in the life of Plato when the ethical teaching of
Socrates came into conflict with the metaphysical theories of the earlier
philosophers, and he sought to supplement the one by the other. The older
philosophers were great and awful; and they had the charm of antiquity.
Something which found a response in his own mind seemed to have been lost
as well as gained in the Socratic dialectic. He felt no incongruity in the
veteran Parmenides correcting the youthful Socrates. Two points in his
criticism are especially deserving of notice. First of all, Parmenides
tries him by the test of consistency. Socrates is willing to assume ideas
or principles of the just, the beautiful, the good, and to extend them to
man (compare Phaedo); but he is reluctant to admit that there are general