many separate individuals, and will therefore be in a state of separation
from itself.

Nay, but the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many
places at once, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may
be one and the same in all at the same time.

I like your way, Socrates, of making one in many places at once. You mean
to say, that if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men,
there would be one whole including many--is not that your meaning?

I think so.

And would you say that the whole sail includes each man, or a part of it
only, and different parts different men?

The latter.

Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which
participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea
existing in each of them?

That seems to follow.

Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible
and yet remains one?

Certainly not, he said.

Suppose that you divide absolute greatness, and that of the many great