Parmenides by Plato
page 86 of 161 (53%)
page 86 of 161 (53%)
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Clearly not. Then it is neither named, nor expressed, nor opined, nor known, nor does anything that is perceive it. So we must infer. But can all this be true about the one? I think not. 1.b. Suppose, now, that we return once more to the original hypothesis; let us see whether, on a further review, any new aspect of the question appears. I shall be very happy to do so. We say that we have to work out together all the consequences, whatever they may be, which follow, if the one is? Yes. Then we will begin at the beginning:--If one is, can one be, and not partake of being? Impossible. Then the one will have being, but its being will not be the same with the one; for if the same, it would not be the being of the one; nor would the |
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