Critical Miscellanies (Vol 2 of 3) - Essay 1: Vauvenargues by John Morley
page 19 of 37 (51%)
page 19 of 37 (51%)
![]() | ![]() |
|
imagination,' he asks, 'than Bossuet, Montaigne, Descartes, Pascal, all
of them great philosophers? Who more judgment and wisdom than Racine, Boileau, La Fontaine, Molière, all of them poets full of genius? _It is not true, then, that the ruling qualities exclude the others; on the contrary, they suppose them._ I should be much surprised if a great poet were without vivid lights on philosophy, at any rate moral philosophy, and it will very seldom happen for a true philosopher to be totally devoid of imagination.'[31] With imagination in the highest sense Vauvenargues was not largely endowed, but he had as much as is essential to reveal to one that the hard and sober-judging faculty is not the single, nor even the main element, in a wise and full intelligence. 'All my philosophy,' he wrote to Mirabeau, when only four or five and twenty years old, an age when the intellect is usually most exigent of supremacy, 'all my philosophy has its source in my heart.'[32] In the same spirit he had well said that there is more cleverness in the world than greatness of soul, more people with talent than with lofty character.[33] Hence some of the most peculiarly characteristic and impressive of his aphorisms; that famous one, for instance, '_Great thoughts come from the heart,_' and the rest which hang upon the same idea. 'Virtuous instinct has no need of reason, but supplies it.' 'Reason misleads us more often than nature.' 'Reason does not know the interests of the heart.' 'Perhaps we owe to the passions the greatest advantages of the intellect.' Such sayings are only true on condition that instinct and nature and passion have been already moulded under the influence of reason; just as this other saying, which won the warm admiration of Voltaire, '_Magnanimity owes no account of its motives to prudence_,' is only true on condition that by magnanimity we understand a mood not out of accord with the loftiest kind of prudence.[34] But in the eighteenth century reason and prudence were words current in their |
|