they ought to be so, I mean, on the Christian supposition of the object
of Christianity being moral probation, and 'faith' both the test and the
reward.

From this many practical considerations ensue. E.g. the duty of parents
to educate their children in what they _believe_ as distinguished from
what they _know_. This would be unjustifiable if faith were the same as
opinion. But it is fully justifiable if a man not only knows that he
believes (opinion) but believes that he knows (faith). Whether or not
the Christian differs from the 'natural man' in having a spiritual organ
of cognition, provided he honestly believes such is the case, it would
be immoral in him not to proceed in accordance with what he thus
believes to be his knowledge. This obligation is recognized in education
in every other case. He is morally right even if mentally deluded.


Huxley, in _Lay Sermons_, says that faith has been proved a 'cardinal
sin' by science. Now, this is true enough of credulity, superstition,
&c., and science has done no end of good in developing our ideas of
method, evidence, &c. But this is all on the side of intellect. 'Faith'
is not touched by such facts or considerations. And what a terrible hell
science would have made of the world, if she had abolished the 'spirit
of faith' even in human relations. The fact is, Huxley falls into the
common error of identifying 'faith' with opinion.


Supposing Christianity true, it is very reasonable that faith in the
sense already explained should be constituted the test of divine
acceptance. If there be such a thing as Christ's winnowing fan, the
quality of sterling weight for the discovery of which it is adapted