the same kind that we committed in Afghanistan--that is, taking upon
ourselves the most odious part of the executive administration. In
such a situation this should have been avoided, if possible. There is
a kind of chivalry in this--if there is anything odious to be done,
or repugnant to the feelings of the people, a young Englishman thinks
he must do it himself, lest he should be thought disposed to shift
off a painful burthen upon others; and he thinks it unbecoming of us
to pay any regard to popular feeling. Of course, also, the officers
of the Sikh State are glad to get rid of such burthens while they see
English gentlemen ready to carry them. Now, it strikes me that we
might, with a little tact, have altered all this, and retained the
good feelings of the people, by throwing the executive upon the
officers of the Sikh State, and remaining ourselves in the dignified
position of Appellate Courts for the redress of grievances inflicted
by these officers in neglect of duty or abuse of authority. Our duty
would have been to guide, control, and check, and the head of all
might have been like the sovereigns of England--known only by his
acts of grace.

By keeping in this dignified position we should not only have
retained the good feelings of the people, but we should have been
teaching the Sikh officers their administrative duties till the time
comes for making over the country; and the chief and Court would have
found the task, made over to them under such a system, more easy to
sustain. In Afghanistan we did the reverse of all this, and became
intolerably odious to the mass of the people; for they saw that
everything that was harsh was done by us, and the officers of the
King were disposed to confirm and increase this impression because
they were not employed. The people of the Punjaub are not such
fanatics, and they are more divided in creed and caste, while they