in Afghanistan; and I believe that the notion now generally prevalent
is, that our professed intentions of delivering over the country to
its native ruler were not honest, and that we should have
appropriated the country to ourselves could we have done so.

There are two classes of native Governments in India. In one the
military establishments are all national, and depend entirely upon
the existence of native rule. They are officered by the aristocracy
of the country, chiefly landed, who know that they are not fitted for
either civil or military office under our system, and must be reduced
to beggary or insignificance should our rule be substituted for that
of their native chief. In the other, all the establishments are
foreign, like our own. The Seiks were not altogether of the first
class, like those of Rajpootana and Bundelcund, but they were so for
the most part; and when they saw all offices of trust by degrees
being filled by Captain This and Mr. That, they gave up all hopes of
ever having their share in the administration.

Satisfied that this was our error in Afghanistan, in carrying out the
views of Lord Ellenborough in the Gwalior State, I did everything in
my power to avoid it, and have entirely succeeded, I believe; but it
has not been done without great difficulty. I considered Lord
Hardinge's measures good, as they interposed Hindoo States between us
and a beggarly and fanatical country, which it must be ruinous to our
finances to retain, and into which we could not avoid making
encroachments, however anxious the Government might be to avoid it,
if our borders joined. But I supposed that we should be content with
guiding, controlling, and supervising the native administration, and
not take all the executive upon ourselves to the almost entire
exclusion of the native aristocracy. I had another reason for